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1. Introduction
[Networks] As large-scale networks, one can think of transportation networks, which consist
of very many roads, through which lots of vehicles run through. It is inappropriate if the
utilization factors of the networks are so low that the amounts of traffic through the networks
are too small, or if the sojourn times of vehicles are too long due to the congestion. In
relation to the notion of transportation networks, we have the term ‘information highway,’
which means information networks that are represented by the Internet. The Internet is an
information network consisting of a great many nodes (or routers) and the communication
lines interconnecting them, through which packets (in place of vehicles) run. Commonly as
transportation networks, it is inappropriate if the utilization factors of the networks are so
low that the amounts of traffic through the networks are too small or if the sojourn times of
packets are too long due to the congestion.
It is appropriate if each portion of the networks has a suitable amount of traffic and if vehicles
or packets (later we call both of them ‘users’ or ‘players’) pass through it within suitable time
lengths. We cannot be sure, however, that such good situations are always kept. In order
to keep such good situations, we need to control the networks in one way or others. More
concretely, we need to select adequately the paths for users to run through (i.e., routing) or to
decide adequately the rates of users to run through the networks (i.e., flow control).
In distributed computer systems including recently highlighted Grids (a method of sharing
computer resources by using communication networks), we have the problems of load
balancing in order to have the high efficiency of utilizing computing resources (for
example, [26, 34, 53]) that are equivalent to routing problems in the networks. In this chapter,
we present some seemingly paradoxical results on the routing problems and on the equivalent
load balancing problems. There have been found similar seemingly paradoxical results on
flow control [19, 20], but we do not discuss them here.
©2013 Kameda, licensee InTech. This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0),which permits
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[Distributed and independent decision making] On one hand, in general, the
above-mentioned networks are of large scales and overall detailed control of them may
be difficult. On the other hand, they are usually shared by users or organizations that
make independent decisions; e.g., in transportation networks, there are independent vehicle
owners and enterprises that run buses and trucks; e.g., in the Internet, there are Internet
service providers that are private enterprises and universities/research organizations, each
of which is considered to make independent decisions. These independent decision makers
are equivalent to what are called ‘players’ in the framework of game theory.
Lots of people may believe that in a network or in a system, if each independent decision
maker coincidently pursues the reduction of the cost relevant to itself, the overall utility
of the network or of the system may increase. As to economic behavior, it appears to be
generally believed that, if each decision maker seeks its profit independently, selfishly, and
noncooperatively from others, the overall social system may achieve the most economical
state by the guidance of so-called ‘Invisible Hand’ as mentioned by Adam Smith [50]. In
the situations where the overall detailed control seems to be difficult in such as large-scale
networks, the believes in the effectiveness of independent decision making, may lead to the
expectations that if each user (or player) makes decisions only for its own objective, the
entire problem of obtaining the best system state is divided into the collection of dispersed
smaller-scale problems each of which is more easily solved than the entire problem.
[Paradox] There have been found phenomena seemingly quite paradoxical to the
above-mentioned belief, for example, what is called the ‘Braess paradox,’ which we discuss
later in this chapter. This chapter present some research results on the possible magnitudes
of the harms brought by such paradoxical phenomena. In fact, it looks that no big harms
induced by such paradoxical phenomena like large coincident performance deterioration of
user costs, have been reported thus far. We have already the situations where the Internet is
shared by a great number of independent Internet service providers and where online POS
(Point of Sales) systems are shared by mutually independent chains of convenience stores. In
spite of that, no big problems such as the above-mentioned severe performance degradation
have been revealed.
We expect, however, that each independent organization will pursue its cost decrease much
more seriously in the future and that the scales of the shared networks and the numbers of
users sharing the networks will become much larger. We will thus need to investigate the
above-mentioned problems and to gain much powerful insight into the problems.
1.1. Different degrees in the dispersion of decision making
We can think of different degrees in the dispersion of decision making.
(A)[Completely centralized decision making]: All users are regarded to belong to one group
that has only one decision maker (Only one player in the game). The decision maker seeks to
optimize a single performance measure such as the total cost over all users (for example, the
expected sojourn time over all users). In the literature, the corresponding solution concept is
referred to as a system optimum, overall optimum, cooperative optimum or social optimum.
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In this chapter, we shall refer to it as the overall optimum. This may reflect the situation where
the entire system is controlled by a single unified organization (i.e., only one player).
(B)[Completely dispersed decision scheme]: Each of infinitely many infinitesimal users
optimizes its own cost (for example, its own expected sojourn time), independently and
selfishly of the others. In this optimized situation, each job cannot expect any further benefit
by changing unilaterally its own decision. In this setting, the number of such users is so many
that the impact of any one such user is infinitesimally small on the costs experienced by all
other users. It is then assumed that the decision of a single job has a negligible impact on the
performance of the entire system.
In these types of noncooperative networks, each infinitesimal, i.e., “non-atomic” (as some
game-theorists say), user makes its own routing decision so as to minimize its expected delay
from its origin to its destination given the routing decisions of other users. In this case,
the situation where every infinitesimal user has optimized its decision, given the decisions
of other users, and would not unilaterally deviate from that choice, is called an individual
equilibrium. The name given to this form of equilibrium is Wardrop equilibrium, i.e., a Nash
equilibrium with infinitesimal players (nonatomic users) ([18, 41, 54] etc. ).
(C)[[Intermediately dispersed decision scheme]: Infinitely many jobs (users) are classified
into a finite number (N(> 1)) of classes or groups, each of which has its own decision maker
and is regarded as one player or user. Each decision maker optimizes non-cooperatively its
own cost (e.g., the expected sojourn time) over only the jobs of its own class. The decision of
a single decision maker of a group has a non-negligible impact on the performance of other
groups. In this optimized situation, each of a finite number of classes or players cannot receive
any further benefit by changing unilaterally its decision. In the literature, the corresponding
solution concept is referred to as a class optimum, Nash equilibrium, or user optimum. In
this chapter, we shall refer to it as the group optimum. This may reflect the situation where the
system is shared by a finite number of mutually independent organizations each of which is
totally unified. We may have different levels in intermediately dispersed optimization.
In this situation, the users are referred to as “atomic” (as some game-theorists say) in that each
user’s decision has an impact on the costs experienced by the other users. The situation where,
in such a scheme, every user has optimized his decision, given the decisions of other users,
and furthermore, would not unilaterally deviate from this decision is called aNash equilibrium,
since it is, in this respect, “stable” [18, 24, 27].
Note that (C) is reduced to (A) when the number of players reduces to 1 (N = 1) and
approaches (B) when the number of players becomes infinitely many (N → ∞) [18]. In the
cases of (B) and (C), there are plural decision makers and they can be regarded as ‘games’ (in
particular, congestion games (for example, [42, 46])). In the terms of economics, (A), (B), and
(C), respectively, present monopoly, perfect competition, and oligopoly.
1.2. Pareto inefficiency and paradox
We think that the cost (or utility) of each user is determined for each state of the system.
For example, if the route through which each user runs through and the amount of traffic
of each path is determined, the total cost (or utility) of each user (decision maker, or player)
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will be determined. In engineering fields, as the measure of evaluating the system status, a
single measure such as the sum or the weighted means of the costs (or utilities) of all users
(or players) has been used in general so far. It is questionable or problematic, however, to
determine the superiority between the two states of the system if, in one system state, the
utility of one user is better than that of another user and if, in the other system state, the the
utility of the former user is worse than that of the latter user.
The exact definition of superiority among system states is given in terms of Pareto notions.
The notions of Pareto optimality, superiority, and inefficiency have already been established.
In the next section, we first confirm the notions and their definitions. Then, we discuss a
definition of the measure of Pareto superiority.
1.3. Pareto optimality and superiority
We consider a system consisting of a number of users or players, numbered 1, 2, · · · , n (Denote
by n the set {1, 2, · · · , n}). For each state of the system, each user has its own utility. Denote a
combination of utilities of all users in a system state S by U(S) = (U1(S),U2(S), . . . ,Un(S)).
We consider only the cases where Ui(S) > 0 for all i.
[Pareto optimality and efficiency]: There may exist a state of the system where we cannot
improve the utility of each user without decreasing the utility of some other user. This is called
a Pareto optimum or efficient state. In general, theremay be infinitelymany Pareto optimal states
for a system. Consider the space of the combinations of utilities U(S) for all system state S.
That is, each point U(S) in the utility space corresponds to a combination of utilities of the
users of a system state. Then, each axis of the utility space shows the utility of a user given the
system state. The set of points corresponding to Pareto optimal states forms the border (Pareto
border) separating the set of achievable combinations of utilities from the set of unachievable
ones in the utility space.
[Pareto superiority and inferiority]: Consider an arbitrary pair of two (achievable) states of
the system, Sa and Sb: If Ui(Sa) ≤ Ui(Sb) for all i and Ui(Sa) < Ui(Sb) for some i, then Sa is
Pareto inferior to Sb and Sb is Pareto superior to Sa. Define ki  Ui(Sb)/Ui(Sa). Then, Sb is
Pareto superior to Sa if and only if ki > 1 for some i and kj ≥ 1 for all other j. Sb is Pareto inferior
to Sa if and only if ki < 1 for some i and kj ≤ 1 for all other j.
We define strong Pareto superiority and inferiority. That is, Sb is strongly Pareto superior to Sa iff
ki > 1 for all i. Sb is strongly Pareto inferior to Sa iff ki < 1 for all i. A state to which some other
state is (strongly) Pareto superior is (strongly) Pareto inefficient.
An overall optimum is evidently Pareto optimal. Individual optima or group optima (Nash
equilibria) may be Pareto optimal (for example, [1, 7]), but may not be Pareto optimal as in the
game called the prisoners’ dilemma (for example, [38]). It has been shown that if the utility of
each player is continuous, Nash equilibria are generally Pareto inefficient (See [13, 49]).
[A measure of Pareto superiority/inferiority]: As we see in the above, the definition of
Pareto superiority/inferiority has already given and well accepted. It seems, however, that
the measure of the degree of Pareto superiority/inferiority has not been generally accepted. The
measure is necessary, e.g., for defining the degree of paradoxical coincident cost degradation.
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The Pareto superiority depends on the vector (k1, k2, . . . , kn). It would, however, be
convenient to express the degree of Pareto superiority by a single scalar measure. The primary
concern must be the requirement that the value of the measure clearly distinguish cases of
Pareto inferiority and, thus, paradoxes, from other cases, simply and almost clearly. Define
kmin  mini ki and kmax  maxi ki. If kmin > 1, the state Sb is (strongly) Pareto superior to Sa,
and if kmin < 1, the state Sb is Pareto indifferent or inferior to Sa. If kmax < 1, the state Sb is
(strongly) Pareto inferior to Sa, and if kmax > 1, the state Sb is Pareto indifferent or superior
to Sa. Thus, the measures kmin and kmax may be used as primary measures of the degree of Pareto
superiority and inferiority, respectively. We note that if kmin < 1 and kmax > 1, states Sa and Sb
are mutually Pareto indifferent to each other. On the other hand, for example, a measure X
based on a certain average of all of ki should be rejected, since it can hold that X > 1 even
if some ki < 1 for some i but if kj ≫ 1 for all other j’s. Such a measure may be used as a
secondary measure. (In many practical situations, the variables may have continuous values
and truly exact equalities occur rarely. Or, the tie-breaking of the case that kmin = 1 may
depend on such a secondary measure.)
We propose that kmin(>1) and kmax(< 1) are used as primary measures showing the degrees of
Pareto superiority and inferiority, respectively. The tie-breaking of the case that kmin = 1 and that
kmax = 1 may depend on some other secondary measure.
Note, in passing, that a measure similar to the above has been used to discuss the effects of
symmetry on globalizing separated monopolies to a Nash-Cournot oligopoly [28].
[Pareto inefficiency and paradox] Braess paradox presents an example of the case where for
an equilibrium system state there exists a non-equilibrium system state that is Pareto superior
to it as shown later. This chapter presents the research results on the cases where (paradoxical)
coincident cost degradation of each user occurs and on the possible sizes of such coincident
cost degradation. On the other hand please note that there exist cases where coincident cost
improvement for each user is unlimitedly large [22].
The price of anarchy The idea of a measure, the price of anarchy, was mentioned by
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [32], and its name ‘the price of anarchy’ appeared in
Papadimitriou [39]. The term ‘anarchy’ is considered to mean the state of a Nash or Wardrop
equilibrium which is reached by the situation where every player behaves selfishly or freely
under no constraints imposed by a central controller to optimize its own cost or utility. The
measure looks to show the degree how bad is the state of the worst-case Nash/Wardrop
equilibrium against the best state. The proposer of the measure uses, as the best state, the state
with the optimal social cost. Then, the price of anarchy is equal to the ratio of the social cost of
the worst-case Nash/Wardrop equilibrium to the minimum social cost. A number of results
have been obtained based on this measure, many of which are described by Roughgarden
[43, 45]. In fact, before the idea of the measure, price of anarchy, was proposed, anomalous
behaviors of Wardrop and Nash equilibria compared with social optima, like those expressed
in terms of the price of anarchy, had already been discovered and investigated in the context
of load balancing in distributed computer systems that was identical to routing in networks
of particular types [25, 26, 55].
On the other hand, the measure of the Pareto inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium has to reflect
the comparison with all the Pareto optima, whereas the state with the optimal social cost is
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only one Pareto optimum. Therefore, the price of anarchy cannot be a good measure of the
Pareto inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium [33]. Following the spirit of the price of anarchy,
we may think of the ratio of the social cost of state A to that of state B for comparing
two states A and B. According to the discussion given above on the measure of Pareto
superiority/inferiority and paradoxes, we do not use the above-mentioned measure that has
the spirit of the price of anarchy as the primary measure of Pareto superiority/inferiority
and paradoxes but may use it as a secondary measure. We note that the above-mentioned
anomalous behavior of the Wardrop/Nash equilibrium necessarily occurs when the Braess
paradox occurs, but not vice versa.
2. Braess paradox
[Braess network] Braess [5] considered a network consisting of 4 nodes, 1 origin (0), 2 relay
nodes (1,2), and 1 destination (3) (Fig. 1). As shown in Fig. 1 left, before adding a link, the
network has two paths, 0-1-3 (Path 1) and 0-2-3 (Path 2), each of which contains two links,
Link 1 (from Node 0 to Node 1) and Link 2 (from Node 1 to Node 3) for the first path, and
Link 3 (fromNode 0 to Node 2) and Link 4 (from Node 2 to Node 3) for the second: See Fig. 1
left. After adding new link (Link 5), i.e., a one-way link connecting the two relay nodes 1 and
2, the network has three paths including the new, third, path 0-1-2-3 (Path 3): See Fig. 1 right.
In the original Braess network, the cost of each link is a linear function of the amount of the
flow through the link ([5]).
a(x)
b(x) c(y)
a(u+w)
b(u) c(v+w)
d(v)
t(w)
d(y)
0
1 2
3
0
1 2
3
Figure 1. Braess network.
Lots of users pass through the network from the origin (0) to destination (3). The passage time
through each link is determined by the rate of users that pass through the link. Each user
strives to pass through the path of the minimum sojourn time. Each user cannot decrease its
sojourn time by unilaterally changing the path it chooses to pass through in the equilibrium
state, that is, the Wardrop equilibrium or individual optimum. Since the network has only one
origin and one destination, any paths used have the same cost (the identical sojourn time). As
shown in Fig. 1, if the rates of users that pass through links 01, 13, 23, 02, and 12, respectively,
are η1, η2, η3, η4 and η5, the passage times through links 01, 13, 23, 02, and 12, are a(η1), b(η2),
c(η3), d(η4), and t(η5).
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Denote by X the total rates of users that pass through network. Before adding a link, the two
paths 0-1-3 and 0-2-3, respectively, have the rates of users passing through, x and y (x+ y =
X). After adding a link, the three paths, 0-1-3, 0-2-3, and 0-1-2-3, respectively, have the rates
of users passing through, u, v, and w (u+ v+ w = X). Denote by Co and Cc, respectively, the
costs of the paths before and after adding a link. The ratio of the cost before adding a link and
that after adding a link is denoted by k = Cc/Co.
[Braess paradox] Braess [5] presents such an example that, if a(η) = c(η) = 10η, b(η) =
d(η) = η + 50, t(η) = η + 10, X = 6, then Co = 83, Cc = 92, and k = Cc/Co = 1.1084 . . . .
That is, by adding a link, the cost of all users (sojourn time) increases by about 10 percent.
Adding a link leads to the augmentation of the degree of the freedom of decision making. In
spite of it, it looks paradoxical that adding a link brings about the cost degradation to all users
or decisionmakers. Thus the above-mentioned phenomenon is regarded as ‘paradox.’ In fact,
it has been observed that similar paradox occurs in the real world [29]. Thus, we see that the
existence of a state that is Pareto superior to a Wardrop equilibrium has been shown.
[Cohen-Kelly paradox] In the Braess network, linear functions are considered as the link costs.
The link cost functions considered in the networks of queues are nonlinear in general. Cohen
and Kelly [10] considered the following network with nonlinear link costs. λ and φ are system
parameters. X = 2λ. Link flows η1, η2, η3, η4 and η5, respectively, give b(η2) = d(η4) = 2,
t(η5) = 1, a(η1) = 1/(φ − η1) (if 0 ≤ η1 < φ, otherwise a(η1) is ∞), c(η3) = 1/(φ− η3) (if
0 ≤ η3 < φ, otherwise c(η3) is ∞). Then, assuming 2λ > φ− 1 > λ > 0, it is shown that
Co = 1/(φ− λ) + 2 < 3 = Cc, that is, 1 < k < 3/2. This also is regarded as a paradox. Thus,
the ratio of degradation, k, is less than 1.5.
[The researches related to Braess paradox] Later, Braess paradox gradually caused attention
of many scholars including economist Samuelson [48] and related studies have been
accumulated including the above-mentioned study by Cohen and Kelly [10] (For example,
[6, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17, 35, 36, 40, 51, 52]). In addition, it has been shown that for mechanical
and electrical systems that have the topology similar to the Braess network, there may
occur phenomena similar to Braess paradox, and the results were presented in a scientific
journal, Nature [8]. A list of references on the Braess paradox is kept in Braess’s home page
(http://homepage.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Dietrich.Braess/#paradox).
Almost all of the related results have been obtained as toWardrop equilibria, and most of them
have discussed the networks that have the same topology as that of Braess’s or its generalized
versions. Furthermore, some have handled only weak Paradox as explained later. Moreover,
it has been shown that there exists a case of similar paradox as to a group optimum (Nash
equilibrium of a finite number of users) in a network whose topology is similar to the Braess
network [30]. Korilis et al. [31] have obtained a sufficient condition whereby no paradox
occurs in a network with one origin and one destination and with plural groups of users of
the same kind.
[The bounds of the degrees of the paradox in networks of Wardrop equilibrium] There
seem to have been only a few studies that have provided an estimation of how harmful
the paradox can be, i.e., the worst-case degree of coincident cost degradation for all users
by adding connections to a noncooperative system [21, 44, 47]. As to a generalized Braess
network as shown in Fig. 1, it has been shown that, if functions a and c are increasing and
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if functions b, d, and t are non-decreasing, k < 2, i.e., the degree of paradox cannot be over
2 [21]. Furthermore, if a generalized Braess network is embedded in a larger network, the
degree of paradox with respect to the embedded network cannot be over 2 [21]. As a more
general result, it has been shown that as to networks consisting of one origin, one destination,
n nodes and links of nondecreasing costs, the degree of paradox cannot be over ⌊n/2⌋ [44]. An
extreme case of it is shown in Fig. 2. The left-hand part of the figure shows the network before
adding 3 links (depicted by vertical thin dotted lines) and the right-hand part of the figure
presents the network after adding 3 links (depicted by vertical upward thick solid lines). In
the figure, nodes means the point to which 3 lines are connected. Thus, the network has 8
nodes, A, B,C,D, E, F,G, and H. The total flow rate of users are 4. The extremely thin lines
show zero flow rates and thick solid lines show positive flow rates. In the left-hand part of
the figure, there are 4 paths, ABH, ACDH, AEFH and AGH, each has flow rate 1, and in the
right-hand part of the figure, there are 3 paths, ACBH, AEDH, and AGFH, each of which has
flow rates 4/3. Each line with 0 in the left part and with 1 in the right part has cost 0, if the
flow rate through it is not larger than 1, and cost 1, if the flow rate through it is larger than 1.
Each line with 1 both in the left part and in the right part has cost 1 regardless of the flow rate.
Each of added link has cost 0. In this figure, for 8 nodes, Co = 1, and Cc = 4, and it shows the
worst-case paradox, k = ⌊8/2⌋ = 4.
Figure 2. The network with 8 nodes that shows the worst case paradox k = 4.
In fact, it is likely that there has not been found any system in Wardrop equilibrium (with
infinitesimal users) for which the degree of coincident cost degradation can increase without
bound if the number of nodes in the network is bounded. On the other hand, we have also
seen that the benefit brought by the addition of connections to a noncooperative network can
increase without bound [22]. In contrast, it has been shown that there exists a system in a
Nash equilibrium (with a finite number of users) for any size of the degree of the paradox as
shown in the later section 4.1.1 and by [27].
3. Coincident cost degradation (Paradox) for all users by adding
connections to networks
[The degree of coincident cost degradation (Paradox)] As to the above-mentioned networks
in Wardrop equibria that has only one origin and one destination, the cost of all users are
identical, and the comparison between the costs of before and after adding connections to the
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networks may be rather easy. In other networks, however, the costs of users are not necessarily
identical, and we define here the degree of paradoxes for those networks. It seems that such
definitions have not received attention until rather recently.
Following the section 1.2, we consider the concept of strong Pareto superiority. Denote by Sb
and Sa, respectively, the states before and after adding connections. Assume that the costs of
uses are positive. In fact, in the examples presented in this chapter, they are so.
Consider, for user i ∈ n, ki given by ki = Cai /C
b
i . If ki > 1 for all i ∈ n, S
b is Pareto superior
to Sa, which means a paradox. Define kmin such that kmin = minp kp. That ki > 1 for all i ∈ n
is equivalent to that kmin > 1. In contrast, if ki ≤ 1 for some i ∈ n, i.e., kmin ≤ 1, Sb is not
Pareto superior to Sa, which implies no paradox. Thus, kmin shows whether a paradox occurs.
We consider furthermore, that kmin shows the degree of a paradox. We thus consider kmin the
measure of the degree of a paradox [22]. Note that the networks mentioned in Section 2 have
only one origin and one destination, and that, in each Wardrop equilibrium, the utility (cost,
e.g., sojourn time) of every user is the same, and that kmin degenerates to k. Thus, as to the
Braess-like paradoxes, only in this special cases, the price of anarchy can be a good measure
of paradoxes.
[Weak paradox] In the paradoxes discussed in this chapter, the state Sb before adding
connections is strongly Pareto superior to the state Sa after adding connections. On the other
hand, even if Sb is not strongly Pareto superior to Sa, it is possible that the social or overall
cost of users (for example, the overall average sojourn time or passage time for all users or
packets) for Sb is better than Sa, which looks anomalous [26, 55]. In such a case, however,
adding connections does not lead to the coincident cost degradation for all users. We call such
an anomalous case a weak paradox. In the cases presented in Section 2, it holds that ki = k,
but it does not necessarily holds in general. In particular, the degree of cost degradation may
be different for each user (i ∈ n). The results that depend only on the price of anarchy may
show only a weak paradox and not a (strong) paradox, and this chapter does not touch on
such results.
4. The systems where the cost of each user may not necessarily be
identical ——- Paradoxes in the models of distributed computer systems
During about 30 years since the Braess paradox had started to attract attention of many
authors, a lot of papers related to it were published, but in almost all of them, the networks
discussed by them looked to have either the topology similar to the Baress’s, or to have each
user non-distinct with only one pair of the origin and the destination. As networks that have
each user with distinct cost, we show the networks of distributed computer systems. That is,
as to the group optima in a model of distributed computer systems, an example of (strong)
paradox has been found. This type of paradox may occur for symmetric systems, and in some
cases, the degree of paradox (coincident cost degradation) can increase without bound.
4.1. Analytic results on symmetric distributed computer systems
As to the paradoxes for symmetric distributed computer systems, there have been obtained
very general and complicated analytical results [27], which is presented in the appendix to
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Figure 3. Amodel of distributed systems – Independent.
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Figure 4. Amodel of distributed systems – Interconnected.
this chapter. In the next Section 4.1.1, by using a special case of the above-mentioned systems,
some basic results that give intuitions into the nature of the paradox are presented.
4.1.1. A simple example of the paradox for symmetric distributed systems
Consider a model of distributed systems consisting of two nodes, as shown in Figs. 3 and 4. μ,
φ, and Ti, respectively, denote the processing capacity of each node (computer), the job arrival
rate to each node, and the expected sojourn time of the job that arrives at node i. Each node
i is associated with one decision maker who decides the rate xij (i 	= j) of jobs to forward to
the other node j in order to minimize selfishly only the cost Ti for the jobs that arrive at node
i. The equilibrium state is a group optimum (a Nash equilibrium). When there is no network
connection between the two nodes as shown in Fig. 3, each decision maker cannot forward
jobs to the other node, and, in the group equilibrium state,
T1 = T2 =
1
μ− φ
(M/M/1).
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Figure 5. Amodel of distributed systems – A Nash equilibrium. x˜ij = x˜ji = x˜ ≥ 0.
After two nodes are inter-connected as shown in Fig. 4, denote by xij the rate of jobs forwarded
from node i to node j. Then,
0 ≤ xij ≤ φ, i, j = 1, 2 (i 	= j) (1)
Define x = (x12, x21). Denote C by the set of the vectors that satisfy relation (1). Assume that
job forwarding takes the time length t irrespective of the value of x. Then,
Ti(x) =
1
φ ∑
k
xikTik(x), (2)
where Tii(x) =
1
μ− βi
, Tij(x) =
1
μ− βj
+ t (j 	= i). (3)
βi denotes the workload on node i, and is obtained as follows:
βi = φi − xi + xj (i 	= j). (4)
Tik(x) denotes the expected sojourn time of a job that arrives at node i and is processed by node
k. After the network connection is added, denote by x˜ the solution (the Nash equilibrium) of
the group optimum (Fig. 5). Then,
Ti(x˜) = min
xij
Ti(xij, x˜ji), (i 	= j).
x˜ is obtained as follows:
(i) The case where t > φ/(μ− φ)2: x˜ = x˜ij = 0, Ti(x˜) =
1
μ− φ
.
The value of Ti is identical to the value before adding the connection, which implies no
paradox occurring.
(ii) The case where 0 < t ≤ φ/(μ− φ)2:
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x˜ = x˜ij = {φ− t(μ− φ)
2}/2 ≥ 0, Ti(x˜) =
1
μ− φ
+ E, where, E =
t
2φ
{φ− t(μ− φ)2} ≥ 0.
E presents the difference of the value of Ti minus the value before adding the connection, and
E > 0 shows the paradox occurring. Therefore, 0 < t < φ/(μ − φ)2 is the necessary and
sufficient condition for the occurrence of the paradox for this model.
[A derivation of the above-mentioned x˜ and Ti(x˜)] From (2) and (4),
∂Ti
∂xi
= −
μ− xj
(μ− φ+ xi − xj)2
+
μ− φ+ xj
(μ− φ− xi + xj)2
+ t (i 	= j). (5)
From (5), we see that
∂Ti
∂xi
is increasing in xi such that x ∈ C. If such x˜ as satisfies the following:
∂Ti
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x=x˜
= 0, i = 1, 2, (6)
the value of x˜ is the solution of the group optimum (the Nash equilibrium). From (5) and by
defining d = x1 − x2,
∂T1
∂x1
−
∂T2
∂x2
=
2μ− (φ+ d)
(μ− φ− d)2
−
2μ− (φ− d)
(μ− φ+ d)2
=
2d
(μ− φ)2 − d2
{
2μ(μ− φ)
(μ− φ)2 − d2
+ 1
}
, (7)
If (6) hold, then, from (7), d = 0. Then, from (5),
∂Ti
∂xi
=
2xi − φ
(μ− φ)2
+ t = 0, i = 1, 2. (8)
Therefore,
xi =
1
2
{φ− t(μ− φ)2}, i = 1, 2, where t ≤
φ
(μ− φ)2
. (9)
From the above, we see that this is a unique solution (case (ii)). From this and (2), we can
obtain Ti(x˜).
For the case where t >
φ
(μ− φ)2
(case (i)), from (8), we have for xi = 0 (i = 1, 2),
∂Ti
∂xi
= t−
φ
(μ− φ)2
> 0, i = 1, 2. (10)
Since
∂Ti
∂xi
is increasing in xi, x˜i = 0, i = 1, 2, is the solution of the group optimum (the Nash
equilibrium). The uniqueness of the solution in this case is shown as outlined as follows:
Assume x˜1 > 0. From the definition of d, (5), and the condition (ii) with respect to t, we must
have d < 0, and thus x˜2 is not to be zero. If we have a similar argument as above with respect
to x˜2 we must have d > 0, which is a contradiction. Thus, we see that x˜ = 0 is a unique group
optimum. For the existence and uniqueness of more general cases, see [2, 23, 37] and [27]. ✷
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For any values of system parameters, the solutions of the overall optimum and the individual
optimum are the same as the solution given above for case (i). Therefore, differently from the
Braess networks, no paradox occurs for the individual optimum (the Wardrop equilibrium) in
this model.
As in the above, we consider that the degree of the paradox is the ratio of the expected sojourn
time after adding the connection to that before doing so. Denote it by k(μ, φ, t) here.
k(μ, φ, t) = 1+
t
2φ
{φ− t(μ− φ)2}(μ− φ).
With φ and μ being fixed, the degree of the paradox is largest when t = φ/[2(μ− φ)2], and
thus
max
t
k(μ, φ, t) = 1+
φ
8(μ− φ)
.
Thus, as the arrival rate φ approaches to the processing capacity μ, the degree of the paradox
can increase without bound. Denote Δ(μ,φ) = maxt k(μ, φ, t) − 1. Then, for example,
Δ(1.00001, 1) = 12500 (1250000% performance degradation), etc.
Therefore, we see that for any system including asymmetric one there exists a symmetric
distributed system that has the larger degree of paradox than it. Thus, symmetric systems
bring about the worst-case paradoxes. As to any group of systems that have finite degrees of
paradox (the characteristics of the groups can be expressed in natural ways), for each group a
symmetric system presents the worst-case paradox among the group as discussed in the later
section 5.
4.1.2. Gereral results on the paradoxes for symmetric distributed systems
Analytic results have been obtained for the models with the number of nodes, the
characteristics of job types, the processing capacities of nodes, and the characteristics of
job-transfer capacities being much more general than those of the model of the above section.
Details are given in the appendix.
5. Paradoxes for asymmetric distributed computer systems
Consider an extension of the models of symmetric distributed systems presented in Section 4.1
to those of asymmetric distributed systems. In the cases where each value of the parameter
describing the system is not identical as to every user, the cost of each user is considered
distinct in a Nash equilibrium. In this section, we consider the system consisting of m nodes,
1, 2, . . . ,m [26, 53]. Jobs are classified into groups, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, depending on the node at
which they arrive, and they arrive at node i according to Poisson distribution with the arrival
rate φi. Out of them, the rate xii of jobs are processed at node i, and the rate xij (i 	= j) of jobs
are forwarded through the transfer facility to node j(j 	= i) and processed there. Thus∑p xip =
φi, xij ≥ 0, i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m are the constraints. Denote by xi the vector (xi1, xi2, . . . , xim), and
by x the vector (x1, x2, . . . , xm). We thus have x = (x11, x12, . . . , x1m, x21, x22, . . . , x2m, . . . , xmm).
Denote by C the set of x’s that satisfy the constraints. Denote Φ = ∑p φp. For each node i,
there is a decision maker (or a player) i (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) who determines the values of xij (j =
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Figure 6. The model of a distributed computer system with asymmetric parameter values (m = 3).
1, 2, . . . ,m) unilaterally within the constraints so that the cost at node i may be minimum.
As the result, node i has the workload βi = ∑q xqi. This system is equivalent to the network
consisting of m origin-destination pairs that have a common destination (See Fig. 6 for the
case of m = 3. In the figure, the variable shown closely to each arrow presents the rate of
jobs passing through the arrow.) Denote by Di(βi) the expected sojourn time (including the
waiting time) of a job that arrives at node i that has the workload βi . It is assumed that Di(βi)
is convex and increasing in βi . Denote by Gij(x) the expected transfer time of forwarding a
job from node i to node j(j 	= i). Denote by Ti(x) the expected sojourn time that a job arrives
at node i and finally goes out of the network. Then we have,
Ti(x) =∑
k
xikTik(x), where Tii(x) = Di(βi), and, for j 	= i, Tij(x) = Dj(βj) + Gij(x).
The group optimal state (the Nash euilibrium) x˜ satisfies the following (for example, [24]).
T˜i = Ti(x˜) = min
xi
Ti(x˜−(i); xi), Constraints: (x˜−(i); xi) ∈ C. (11)
where (x˜−(i); xi) is m× m dimensional vector that is made from x˜ by replacing its elements
corresponding to x˜i by xi. As to the existence and uniqueness of the group optimum (the Nash
equilibrium), see [2, 3].
In the next section, we present some results on the asymmetric and symmetric distributed
systems wherein the degrees of paradoxes are finite. The results show that, in the group
of distributed systems characterized in natural ways, the degrees of paradoxes have the
worst-case values for symmetric systems.
5.1. The models with multiple nodes with nonlinear costs
Consider the model of distributed computer systems consisting of m(≥ 2) nodes. With the
workload βi , the expected node passage time (the cost) is: Di(βi) =
1
μi − βi
(if βi < μi,
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otherwise ∞). The transfer cost Gij(x) has the following two cases (A) and (B):
(A) Gij(x) =
t
1− λt
, j ( 	= i), if λt < 1, otherwise ∞.
where, λ = ∑p ∑q,(q 	=p) xpq denotes the rate of jobs being transferred through the
interconnection. One job-transfer channel is shared by the entire system.
(B) Gij(x) =
t
1− xijt
, j ( 	= i), if xijt < 1, otherwise ∞. The entire system has m(m − 1)
channels.
In either case, t denotes the expected transfer time when there is no waiting on the transfer
line. Thus, 1/t is the transfer capacity. Furtheremore, denote φ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φm) and µ =
(μ1, μ2, . . . , μm).
5.1.1. Numerical experiments
The following algorithm is used to obtain the solution of a group optimum (a Nash
equlibrium).
Given the values of φ,µ, and t,
– Initialization x0 = (x01, x
0
2, . . . , x
0
m) ∈ C.
– Obtain xn (n = (k-1)m+ i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, k = 1, 2, . . . )
as (xn−11 , . . . , x
n−1
i−1 , x
n
i , x
n−1
i+1 , . . . , x
n−1
m ),
where xni = argminxi Ti(x
n−1
1 , . . . , x
n−1
i−1 , xi, x
n−1
i+1 , . . . , x
n−1
m ).
Repeat this step until the conversion.
If the above algorithm converges, a group optimum is obtained. Then, we have the group
optimum cost T˜i(φ,µ, t) of decision maker i for the values of φ,µ, t. It has been shown that,
in the cases where the costs of nodes, etc. are linear, the algorithm converges [4]. In fact, for
all the cases we examined, the algorithm converged. For a given combination of the values of
µi and φ, there exists the value of t∞, such that, in the group optimum, if t ≥ t∞, the transfer
facility is not used.
If the following holds, a paradox occurs.
ki(φ,µ, t) > 1, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, where 0 < t < t
∞. (12)
Here, ki(φ,µ, t) =
T˜i(φ,µ, t)
T˜i(φ,µ, t∞)
. T˜i(φ,µ, t) gives the cost for the decision maker at node i,
given the parameter values φ,µ, and t. Therefore, (12) shows that, if the capacity of the job
transfer increases such that the transfer parameter decreases from t∞ to t, the costs of decision
makers at all nodes increases, which looks paradoxical. The maximum value, Γ(μ, φ), of the
degree of paradox kmin(φ,µ, t) is presented as follows:
Γ(μ,φ) = max
t
{min
i
{ki(φ, μ, t)}}. (13)
In the next section, the values of Γ for the combinations of the values of µ and φ are given.
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5.1.2. The results of numerical experiments
We examined the cases of various combinations of the values µ and φ for some m(≥ 2).
The left and right parts of Fig. 7 presents, respectively, the results of examples of the job
transfer facility of types (A) and (B). We can assume φ1 = 1 without losing the generality.
The horizontal and vertical axes of each part of the figure show, respectively, the values of
μ1 and the worst-case degrees of paradoxes, Γ. The solid curve shows the values of Γ for the
corresponding values of μ1 for the completely symmetric cases (μi = μ1 and φi = 1 for all
i ∈ n). The dotted curve shows, for the corresponding values of μ1, the maximum values of
Γ among those with all combinations of values of μi and φi. The left and right parts of Fig. 7
show, respectively, the cases of 2 and 4 nodes (m = 2 and m = 4), with the transfer facilities
(A) and (B). In both cases, as μ1 increases, the worst-case paradox Γ increases up to some
limit. It seems to be clear that the symmetric systems approaches to the limit. We can observe
that there exists no asymmetric systemwhose values of worst-case paradox Γ depicted by the
dotted curve are over the limit. That is, we can see that for any asymmetric system within
each group, there exists a completely symmetric system whose degree of paradox is equal
to or larger than that of the asymmetric system. In other experiments than those presented
here, we found the same tendencies as shown here [14, 15]. These numerical examinations
may imply that, for any group that can be expressed in natural (not excentric) ways and that
has the finite value of the worst-case paradox, the worst-case paradox can be achieved by a
completely symmetric system within the group.
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Figure 7. Comparison of the values of the worst-case paradoxes for completely symmetric and
asymmetric systems
6. Concluding remarks
In information or transportation networks or distributed computer systems wherein a plural
number of users make independent decisions to minimize their own costs, it may be possible
that all the users have coincident cost degradation similarly as the prisoners’ dilemma or the
Braess paradox. Motivated by the above, in this chapter, we have presented an overview
of the analytical and numerical results on the worst-case degree of paradoxes such that in
selfish routing in networks or in noncooperative load balancing in distributed systems, as the
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degree of freedom in making decisions increases, the costs of all users degrade coincidently.
Furthermore, we have considered the relation between the paradox and the Pareto superiority,
and have shown a measure that gives the degree of paradox. As to the networks in
an individual optimum (an Wardrop equilibrium) wherein decision making is completely
dispersed, the degree of the worst-case paradox is limited for a finite number of nodes in
the networks. On the other hand, as to the networks such as distributed computer systems
like GRID, in an individual optimum, no paradox may occur whereas in a group optimum
(a Nash equilibrium) wherein decision making is intermediately dispersed, paradoxes may
occur and the degree of the paradoxes can increase without bound. Furthermore, for a group
of systems, the worst-case paradox for the group may be achieved by a symmetric system in
the group. For symmetric distributed systems, analytic results have been obtained for general
systems. For asymmetric systems, however, it may not be so easy to obtain analytical results,
and so we have to rely on numerical investigation in order to understand the problems in
question.
Even in the direction of research (such as routing in networks and load balancing in
distributed systems), there may remain to be solved many explicit and implicit problems.
We have discussed here static or quasi-static controls, but it may be far more difficult to obtain
rich results on dynamic controls. Paradoxes in flow controls that we have not discussed here
may be pursued later.
Appendix A: The results on the paradoxes for general symmetric
distributed computer systems
The following shows the results on the models generalized with respect to the number of
nodes, the characteristics of job types, the node processing times, and the job transfer facilities
from the models presented in Section 4.1 [27].
A.1. The model and assumptions
The model described in Section 4.1.1 is generalized as in the following. We consider a system
with m (≥ 2) nodes (host computers or processors) connected with a job-transfer means.
Jobs that arrive at each node i, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, are classified into n types k, k = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Consequently, we havemn different job classes Rik. Each class Rik is distinguished by the node
i at which its jobs arrive and by the type k of the jobs. We call such a class local class, or simply
class. We assume that each node has an identical arrival process and identical processing
capacity. Jobs of type k arrive at each node with node-independent rate φk. We denote the
total arrival rate to the node by φ (= ∑k φk), and without loss of generality, we assume a time
scale such that φ = 1. We also consider what we call global class Jk that consists of the collection
of local class Rik, i.e., Jk =
⋃
i Rik. Jk thus consists of all jobs of type k. Whereas, for local class
Rik, all the jobs arrive at the same node i, the arrivals of the jobs of global class Jk are equally
distributed over all nodes i.
The average processing (service) time (without queueing delays) of a type-k job at any node
is 1/μk and is, in particular, node-independent. We denote φk/μk by ρk and ρ = ∑k ρk. Out
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of type-k jobs arriving at node i, the rate xijk of jobs is forwarded upon arrival through the
job-transfer means to another node j ( 	= i) to be processed there. The remaining rate xiik =
φk − ∑j( 	=i) xijk is processed at node i. Thus ∑q xiqk = φk. That is, the rate xijk of type-k jobs
that arrive at node i is forwarded through the job-transfer means to node j, while the rate xiik
of local-class Rik jobs is processed at the arrival node i. We have 0 ≤ xijk ≤ φk, for all i, j,
k. Within these constraints, a set of values for xik (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, k = 1, 2, · · · , n) are chosen
to achieve optimization, where xik = (xi1k, · · · , ximk) is an m-dimensional vector and called
‘local-class Rik strategy’. We define a global-class Jk strategy as the mm-dimensional vector
xk = (x1k, x2k, · · · , xmk). We will also denote, by an mmn-dimensional vector x, the vector of
strategies concerning all local classes, x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn).We call x the strategy profile.
For a strategy profile x, the load βi on node i is
βi = βi(x) =∑
j,k
μ−1k xjik. (14)
The contribution β(k)i on the load of node i by type-k jobs is
β
(k)
i = β
(k)
i (x) =∑
j
μ−1k xjik, (15)
and clearly βi = β
(1)
i + β
(2)
i + · · ·+ β
(n)
i .
Clearly from (14)
∑
l
βl = ∑
q,l,k
μ−1k xqlk =∑
k
∑
l
∑
q
μ−1k xqlk =∑
k
ρkm = mρ. (16)
We denote the set of x’s that satisfy the constraints (i.e., ∑l xilk = φk, xijk ≥ 0, for all i, j, k) by
C. Note that C is a compact set.
We have the following assumptions:
AssumptionΠ1 The expected processing (including queueing) time of a type-k job that is processed
at node i (or the cost function at node i), is a strictly increasing, convex and continuously differentiable
function of βi , denoted by μ
−1
k D(βi) for all i, k.
Assumption Π2 The expected job-transfer delay (including queueing delay) or the cost for
forwarding type-k jobs arriving at node i to node j (i 	= j), denoted by Gijk(x), is a positive,
nondecreasing, convex and continuously differentiable function of x. Giik(x) = 0. Each job is
forwarded at most once.
We refer to the length of time between the instant when a job arrives at a node and the instant
when it leaves one of the nodes, after all processing and job-transferring, if any, are over as the
sojourn time for the job. The expected sojourn time of a local-class Rik job that arrives at node
i, Tik(x), is expressed as,
Tik(x) =∑
j
xijkTijk(x), (17)
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where
Tiik(x) = μ
−1
k D(βi(x)), and (18)
Tijk(x) = μ
−1
k D(βj(x)) + Gijk(x) = Tiik(x) + Gijk(x), for j 	= i. (19)
Using the fact that all nodes have the same arrival process, the expected sojourn time of a
global-class k job is
Tk(x) =
1
m ∑
i
Tik(x). (20)
The overall expected sojourn time of a job that arrives at the system is
T(x) = ∑
k
φkTk(x) =
1
m ∑
i,k
φkTik(x), (21)
A.2. Results
(A) [Completely centralized decision scheme: Overall optimization] The overall
optimum x¯ is unique and given as follows: For all i, j( 	=i), k, x¯ijk = 0 and x¯iik =
φk (No transfer facility is used). The expected sojourn time is, for all i, k,
Tk(x¯) = Tik(x¯) = μ
−1
k D(ρ), T(x¯) = ρD(ρ).
(B) [Completely dispersed decision scheme: Individual optimization] The individual
optimum xˆ is unique and equal to the overall optimum x¯. Therefore, in contrast to the Braess
network, no paradox occurs in the individual optima.
(C) [Intermediately dispersed decision scheme: Group optimization] Furthermore, we have
the following assumption on the job transfer facility.
[Assumption Π3] Define the following function Gijk(x):
Type G-I: Gijk(x) = ω
−1
k G(ω
−1
k xijk)
(One dedicated line for each combination of a pair of origin and destination nodes, and a local
class: i.e., m(m− 1)n lines in total).
Type G-II(a): Gijk(x) = ω
−1
k G(∑p,q 	=pω
−1
k xpqk)
(One bus line for each global class: i.e., n bus lines in total),
Type G-II(b): Gijk(x) = ω
−1
k G(∑p,q( 	=p),rω
−1
r xpqr)
(One common bus line for the entire system: i.e., 1 bus line.)
where ωk is a constant, G(0) = 1, and G(x) is a nondecreasing, convex, and differentiable
function of x.
Remark A.1 ω−1k can be regarded as the expected job transfer time (without queueing delays)
for forwarding a Type-k job from the arrival node to another processing node. ✷
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The group optimum x˜ satisfies, for all i and k, the following:
Tik(x˜) = min
xik
Tik(x˜−(ik); xik), with constraints: (x˜−(ik); xik) ∈ C,
where (x˜−(ik); xik) is the mmn-dimensional vector with the elements corresponding to x˜ik
being replaced by xik.
Define g˜ijk(·) as follows:
g˜ijk(x) =
∂
∂xijk
{φk ∑
p 	=i
xipkGipk(x)}. (22)
In the case where the assumption Π3 holds, for all i, j( 	= i), k that satisfies xijk = xk, denote as
follows:
Gk(x) = Gijk(x) and g˜k(x) = g˜ijk(x).
Group optimum: Denote Γk = ρ2kσ
−1
k and σk = φk/ωk. The group optimum x˜ is unique and
is given as follows:
The cases of G-I and G-II(a)
(a) As to group Rik such that ΓkD′(ρ) ≤ G(0): For all i, j( 	= i) x˜ijk = 0, and x˜iik = φk. This is
identical to the overall optimum x¯. Similarly, the expected sojourn time is, for all i, k,
Tk(x˜) = Tik(x˜) = μ
−1
k D(ρ), T(x˜) = ρD(ρ).
(b) As to group Rik such that ΓkD′(ρ) > G(0): For all i, j( 	= i), k, x˜ijk = x˜k, where x˜k is the
unique solution of the following:
ρ2kφ
−1
k (φk −mx˜k)D
′(ρ) = g˜k(x˜k)
= σk[G(m(m− 1)ω
−1
k x˜k) +ω
−1
k (m− 1)x˜kG
′(m(m− 1)ω−1k x˜k)].
The expected sojourn time is, for all i, k,
Tk(x˜) = Tik(x˜) = μ
−1
k D(ρ) + φ
−1
k (m− 1)x˜kGk(x˜). (23)
The case of G-II(b)
The group optimum is obtained by the following steps: First, reorder k as follows:
Γ1 ≥ Γ2 ≥ · · · ≥ Γk ≥ · · · ≥ Γn.
The we have the following 3 cases as to K,
ΓKD
′(ρ) > G(0), ΓK+1D
′(ρ) ≤ G(0) (24)
or ΓnD′(ρ) > G(0) (that is, K = n) (25)
or Γ1D
′(ρ) ≤ G(0). (26)
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In the case (26), the unique solution x˜k = 0, for all k, is obtained. In the case (24) or (25), the
unique solution is obtained in the following way. Define Fk(X) as follows:
Fk(X) =
{ k
∑
l=1
σl [ΓlD
′(ρ)− G(X)]
mΓkD
′(ρ) + (m− 1)ω−1l G
′(X)
}
−
X
m(m− 1)
.
Obtain the largest k and X = X˜k˜(> 0) that satisfy Fk˜(X˜k˜) = 0 and [Γk˜D
′(ρ) − G(X˜k˜)] > 0.
Then, by using the next equation (27), we obtain x˜k for k = 1, 2, · · · , k˜,
σk[ΓkD
′(ρ)− G(X˜k˜)] = ω
−1
k x˜k[mΓkD
′(ρ) + (m− 1)ω−1k G
′(X˜k˜)]. (27)
We can thus obtain the unique set of values such that x˜k > 0, k = 1, 2, · · · , k˜ and that x˜k˜+1 =
x˜k˜+2 = · · · = x˜n = 0. This is the unique solution. The expected sojourn time is, for all i, k,
Tk(x˜) = Tik(x˜) = μ
−1
k D(ρ) + φ
−1
k (m− 1)x˜kGk(x˜). (28)
Therefore, we have the following conclusion: In symmetric distributed systems, the necessary
and sufficient condition for the occurrence of paradoxes is that there exists a job type k such
that ΓkD′(ρ) > 1.
Remark A.2 Thus, the possibility of the coincident cost degradations depends on the value
Γk (= ρ
2
k/σk = φkωk/μ
2
k), and different for each group of jobs. The probability of paradox is
higher for groups with the larger arrival rate (φk), with the longer processing time (μ
−1
k ), and
with the smaller job-transfer capacity (ω−1k ). Furthermore, in the case of higher utilization
factors of each node (ρ (= ∑k ρk)), paradoxes may occur more easily. By noting that ∑k φk =
φ = 1, as the number n of job types is greater, each φk becomes smaller, and the possibility
of paradox may be smaller. On the other hand, the number of nodes m may not have big
influence on the occurrence of paradoxes. ✷
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